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Abstract: In this paper, we address the problem of designing a robust reputation mecha-
nism for peer-to-peer services. The mechanism we propose achieves high robustness against
malicious peers (from individual or collusive ones) and provides incentive for participation.
We show that the quality of the reputation value of trustworthy and participating peers
is always better than the one of cheating and non participating ones. Finally we formally
prove that, even when a high fraction of peers of the system exhibits a collusive behavior,
a correct peer can still compute an accurate reputation mechanism towards a server, at the
expense of a reasonable convergence time.
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Un Mécanisme d'Incitation Robuste et Incitatif pour les
Systèmes P2P d'Echange de Services
Résumé : Ce document présente un mécanisme de réputation robuste et incitatif pour
les systèmes P2P d'échange de services. Le mécanisme peut tolérer une grande proportion
de pairs malicieux (individuels ou collusifs) cherchant à biaiser le calcul de la réputation et
incite les utilisateurs à fournir leurs opinions.
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1 Introduction
With the emergence of e-commerce in open, large-scale distributed marketplaces, reputation
systems are becoming attractive for encouraging trust among entities that usually do not
know each other. A reputation system collects, distributes, and aggregates feedback about
the past behavior of a given entity. The derived reputation score is used to help entities
to decide whether a future interaction with that entity is conceivable or not. Without
reputation systems, the temptation to act abusively for immediate gain can be stronger
than the one of cooperating. In closed environments, reputation systems are controlled and
managed by large centralized enforcement institutions. Designing reputation systems in
P2P systems has to face the absence of such large and recognizable but costly organizations
capable of assessing the trustworthiness of a service provider. The only viable alternative is
to rely on informal social mechanisms for encouraging trustworthy behavior [8]. Proposed
mechanisms often adopt the principle that "you trust the people that you know best", just
like in the word-of-mouth system, and build transitivity trust structures in which credible
peers are selected [18, 19, 20]. However such structures rely on the willingness of entities to
propagate information. Facing free-riding and more generally under-participation is a well
known problem experienced in most open infrastructures [2]. The eciency and accuracy of
a reputation system depends heavily on the amount of feedback it receives from participants.
According to a recognized principle in economics, providing rewards is an eective way to
improve feedback. However rewarding participation may also increase the incentive for
providing false information. Thus there is a trade-o between collecting a sizable set of
information and facing unreliable feedback [6]. An additional problem that needs to be
faced with P2P systems, is that peers attempt to collectively subvert the system. Peers
may collude either to discredit the reputation of a provider to lately benet from it (bad
mouthing), or to advertise the quality of service more than its real value to increase their
reputation (ballot stung). Lot of proposed mechanisms break down if raters collude [7].
In this paper we address the robust reputation problem. Essentially this problem aims
at motivating peers to send suciently honest feedback in P2P systems in which peers may
free-ride or be dishonest. This work has been motivated by a previous one in which the
proposed architecture is built on top of a supervising overlay made of trusted peers [3].
The mechanism we propose achieves high robustness to attacks (from individual peers or
from collusive ones), and provides incentive for participation. This is accomplished by an
aggregation technique in which a bounded number of peers randomly selected within the
system report directly observed information to requesting peers. Observations are weighted
by a credibility factor locally computed. Incentive for participation is implemented through
a fair dierential service mechanism. It relies on peer's level of participation, a measure of
peers' contribution over a xed period of time, and on the credibility factor, assessing the
condence one has in a peer.
Our results are promising: We prove that through sucient and honest cooperation,
peers increase the quality of their reputation mechanism. We show that the reputation
estimation eciently lters out malicious behaviors in an adaptive way. Presence of a high
fraction of malicious peers does not prevent a correct peer from computing an accurate
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reputation value, at the expense of a reasonable convergence time. Furthermore, the trade-
o between the sensitivity of the mechanism facing up malicious peers and the duration of
the computation is tuned through a single input parameter. These properties, combined
with the incentive scheme, makes our mechanism adapted to P2P networks. Finally, we
provide a full theoretical evaluation of our solution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 related work is reviewed.
Section 3 presents the model of the environment, and the specication of the robust repu-
tation problem. Section 4 presents the incentive-based mechanism. Section 5 analyses its
asymptotic behavior, its resistance to undesirable behavior and its convergence time.
2 Related Work
There is a rapidly growing literature on the theory and applications of reputation systems,
and several surveys oer a large analyze of the state of art in reputation systems [14, 10, 7].
According to the way ratings are propagated among entities and the extent of knowledge
needed to perform the needed computations, reputation systems fall into two classes, namely
centralized or distributed. An increasing number of online communities applications incor-
porating reputation mechanisms based on centralized databases has recently emerged. The
eBay rating system used to nd traders allows partners to rate each other after completion
of an auction. Despite its primitive reputation system, ebay is the largest person-to-person
online auction with more than 4 millions auctions open at a time [15]. Regardless of this
success, centralized approaches (see for example, [20, 17]) often pay little attention to mis-
behaving entities by assuming that entities give honest feedback to the requesting entity.
More importantly, they rarely address non-participation and collusive behaviors.
Regarding decentralized p2p architecture, several research studies on reputation-based
P2P systems have emerged. Among the rst ones, Aberer and Despotovic [1] propose a
reputation mechanism in which trust information is stored in P-Grid, a distributed hash
table-based (DHT) overlay. Their mechanism is made robust by guaranteeing that trust in-
formation is replicated at dierent peers, and thus can be accessed despite malicious entities.
However, the eciency of their approach relies on peers propensity to fully cooperate by
forwarding requests to feed the P-Grid overlay. Additionally, as for most of the DHT-based
approaches, peers have to store data they are not concerned with. Thus, malicious peers
may discard it to save private resources, leading to a loss of information. Other systems
relying on the trust transitivity approach face false ratings by assuming the presence of
specic faithful and trustworthy peers (e.g. [12]), or by weighting second-hand ratings by
senders' credibility [6, 18, 19]. Opposed to the aforementioned works, Havelaar reputation
system [9], exploits long-lived peers by propagating reports between sets of well dened
peers identied through hash functions. A report contains the observations made during the
current round, the aggregated observations made by the predecessors during the previous
round, and so on for the last r rounds. By relying on such an extensive aggregation, false
reports hardly inuence the overall outcome. Furthermore by using hash functions collusion
is mostly prevented. The eciency of their approach mainly relies on the readiness of peers
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to store and propagate large amount of data, and to remain in the system for relatively
long periods of time. To motivate peers to participate, Jurca and Faltings [11] propose an
incentive-compatible mechanism by introducing payment for reputation. A set of brokers,
the R-agents, buy and sell feedback information. An entity can receive a payment only if the
next entity reports the same result. Weakness of such an approach is the centralization of
the whole information at R-agents, and its robustness against malicious R-agents. Finally,
Awerbuch et al. [4, 5] give lower bounds on the costs of the probes made by honest peers
to nd good objects in eBay-like systems, and propose algorithms that nearly attain these
bounds.
In contrast to these works, we propose a fully distributed mechanism based on local
knowledge that provides malicious and non-participating entities an incentive for participa-
tion and honest behavior.
3 Model
3.1 A P2P Service Model
We consider a P2P service system where service providers (or servers) repeatedly oer the
same service to interested peers. We assume that the characteristics of a server (capabilities,
willingness to oer resources, etc) are aggregated into a single parameter θ called type.
This type inuences the eort exerted by the server through a cost function c. The eort
determines the Quality of the Service (QoS) provided by the server. We assume that the
eort exerted by a server is the same for all the peers that solicit him and takes its value
within the interval [0, 1].
Denition 1 (Eort). The eort of a service provider s is a value q∗s that determines the
quality of the service oered to the peers that interact with s.
After each interaction with server s, each client (or peer) has an imperfect observation of
the eort exerted by s. Peers may have dierent tastes about a server QOS. But basically
these observations are closely distributed around s's eort. Thus, we reasonably assume
that an observed quality of service takes its value within the interval [0, 1] and follows a
normal distribution of mean q∗s and variance σ
∗
s .
Denition 2 (Observed Quality of Service Level). The Observed Quality of Service
Level of a service provider s observed by peer p at time t is a value obssp(t) which is drawn
from a normal distribution over [0, 1] with mean q∗s . The value 1 (resp. 0) characterizes the
maximal (resp. minimal) satisfaction of p.
Estimation of the expected behavior of a server is based on its recent past behavior, that
is, its recent interactions with the peers of the system. Such a restriction is motivated by
game theoretic results and empirical studies on ebay that show that only recent ratings are
meaningful [7]. Thus, in the following, only interactions that occur within a sliding window
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of width D 1 are considered. This approach is also consistent with Shapiro's work [16] in
which it is proven that in an environment where peers can change their eort over time the
eciency of a reputation mechanism is maximized by giving higher weights on recent ratings
and discounting older ratings. Using a sliding time window is approximately equivalent to
this model. Every time a peer p desires to interact with a server s, p asks for feedback from
peers that may have directly interacted with s during the last D time units. We adopt the
terminology witness to denote a peer solicited for providing its feedback. If Psp(t) represents
the set of peers k whose feedback has been received by peer p by time t, then the reputation
value of a server is dened as follows:
Denition 3 (Reputation Value). The reputation value rsp(t) of server s computed by
peer p at time t is an estimation of the eort q∗s exerted by s based on the feedbacks provided
by the peers in Psp(t).
3.2 Specication of Undesirable Behaviors
In practice, peers may not always reveal their real ratings about other peers. They can
either exaggerate their ratings (by increasing or decreasing them), or they can simply reveal
outright ratings to maximize their welfare. This behavior is usually calledmalicious, and can
either be exhibited by a node independently from the behavior of other peers, or be emergent
of the behavior of a whole group. By providing false ratings, malicious peers usually try to
skew the reputation value of a server to a value which is dierent from its true eort. Let
q be this value, and d be the distance between the true eort of the server and the false
rating (d = |q∗s − q|). Then, we characterize the behavior of a peer by wsq = 1− dα, with α a
positive real value which represents the sensitivity of wsq to the distance between the eort
and the expected observation given by q. A malicious peer tries to skew the reputation value
to q by sending ratings that are distributed around q.
Denition 4 (Malicious). A peer p is called malicious if it lies on the reputation of peer
s or creates s's reputation out of thin air. Formally :
E(obssp(t)) = q 6= q∗s , ∀t.
Denition 5 (Collusive Group). A group of peers is called a collusive group if all the
peers of this group behave maliciously towards a same goal. Formally, the set C is a colluding
group if :
E(obssk(t)) = q 6= q∗s , ∀t, k ∈ C.
Another common behavior in P2P systems is peers non-participation. There are two
main reasons why peers may not participate: either because they believe that their work
is redundant with what the others in the group can do, and thus their participation can
hardly inuence the group's outcome, or because they believe that by not contributing
1D can have any pre-dened length of time, i.e., a day, a week or a month. In the sequel, we suppose
that D is insensitive to clock drift.
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they maximize their own welfare (note that information retention could be another pretence
of not participating, however this is out of the scope of the paper). The latter behavior
depicts what is typically called free-riding, while the rst one is described in the Collective
Eort Model (CEM) as social loang [13]. Note that although eects of both behaviors are
similar, i.e., non-participation, their deep cause is dierent. Peers exhibiting one of these
two behaviors are called in the following non-participating peers and are characterized as
follows:
Denition 6 (Non Participating). A peer is called non participating if it exerts less
eort on a collective task than it does on a comparable individual task or consumes more
than its fair share of common resources.
A peer is called correct if during the time it is operational in the system it is neither
malicious nor non-participating. Note that a malicious peer may not participate, on the
other hand, a non participating one is not malicious.
3.3 Specication of the Robust Reputation Problem
Within this context, we address the problem of evaluating the reputation of a service provider
in a dynamic environment in which peers are not necessary correct. This problem is referred
in the sequel as the robust reputation problem. A solution to this problem should guarantee
the following two properties. The rst one states that eventually correct peers should be
able to estimate the reputation value of a target server with a good precision. The second
one says that with high probability, correct peers have a better estimation of the reputation
value of a target server than non correct ones. Formally:
Property 1 (Reputation Value ε-Accuracy). Eventually, the reputation of server s, e-
valuated by any correct peer reects s's behavior with precision ε. That is, let β ∈]0, 1[ be
some xed real, called in the sequel condence level, then:
∃t s.t. ∀t ≥ t, Prob(|rsp(t) − q∗s | ≤ ε) ≥ 1 − β
Let |E(rsp(t))−q∗s | be the bias of the reputation value rsp(t) estimated by peer p. Suppose
that two peers p and q interact with the same target servers at the same time, solicit the
same witnesses, and get the same feedbacks at the same time. That is from the point of
view of their interaction p and q are indistinguishable. However p is correct while q is not.
Then, we have:
Property 2 (Incentive-Compatibility). Eventually, the bias of the reputation value of
server s estimated by p is greater than or equal to the one estimated by peer q. That is, for
a given level of condence β, we have:
∃t s.t. ∀t ≥ t, Prob(|E(rsp(t)) − q∗s | ≥ |E(rsq(t)) − q∗s |) ≥ 1 − β
PI n1816
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4 The Reputation Mechanism
We propose a distributed reputation service which builds a social network among peers.
Briey, every peer records the opinion about the late experiences it has had with a target
server. Peers provide their information on request from peers willing to interact with that
server. Providing a feedback based on direct observations (also called rst-hand observa-
tions) prevents the rumors phenomenon, i.e., the propagation of opinions about others, just
because they have been heard from someone else [18], however is better adapted to appli-
cations with relatively low churn. Upon receipt of "enough" feedback, the requesting peer
aggregates them with its own observations (if any) to estimate the reputation of the target
server, and provides this estimation to its application. Information is aggregated according
to the trust the requesting peer has in the received feedback. Pseudo-code of the reputation
mechanism is presented in Algorithm 1. The eciency of the reputation mechanism fully
depends on i) the number of received feedbacks (i.e., aggregating few feedbacks is not mean-
ingful and thus not helpful), and ii) the quality of each of them (i.e., the trustworthiness of
the feedback). The contribution of this work is the design of a reputation mechanism that
enjoys both properties. The analysis presented in Section 5 shows the importance of each
factor on the convergence time and accuracy of the reputation mechanism.
The solution we propose is a reputation mechanism, and therefore independent of the
rewarding strategy used by the application built on top of this mechanism. That is, the
willingness of a peer to interact with a server results from the application strategy, not from
the peer's one. Clearly, the strategy of the application is greatly inuenced by the reputation
value but other factors may also be taken into account.
4.1 Collecting Feedbacks
When a peer decides to evaluate the reputation value of a service provider, it asks rst-hand
feedback from a set of witnesses in the network. Finding the right set of witnesses is a
challenging problem since the reputation value depends on their feedback. Our approach
for collecting feedbacks follows the spirit of the solution proposed by Yu et al [19], in which
feedbacks are collected by constructing chains of referrals through which peers help one
another to nd witnesses. We adopt the walking principle. However, to minimize the ability
of peers to collude, witnesses are randomly chosen within the system. We assume, in the
following, that the network is regular. Specically, our approach is based on a random walk
(RW) sampling technique. We use the random walk technique as shown in Algorithm 1.
Function query is invoked by the requesting peer that wishes to solicit x witnesses through
r random walks bounded by ttl steps. The requesting peer starts the random walks at a
subset of its neighbors, and runs them for ttl steps. Each peer p involved in the walk is
designated as witness, and as such sends back to the requesting peer its feedback.
When a peer q receives a request from p to rate server s, it checks whether during the
last sliding window of length D, it has ever interacted with s. In the armative, p sets its
feedback to F sp (t) ={(obssp(t0), t0),. . ., (obssp(tl), tl)} with obssp(ti) the QoS of s observed at
time ti, where ti ∈ [max(0, t − D), t]. In case p has not recently interacted with s, p sends
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back to q a default feedback F sp (t) = {(obsmax,⊥)}. As will be shown later, this feedback
prevents p from being tagged non participant by q.
Because of non-participation (volunteer or because of a crash), random walks may fail:
it suces that one of the peers in the walk refuses to participate or crashes to prevent the
walk from successfully ending. If we assume that in the neighborhood of any peer, a fraction
µ of the peers do not participate, then among the r initial peers that start a random walk,
the expected number of peer that may "fail" their random walk is µr. Then during the next
step, µ(1−µ)r walks may "fail", and so on until the TTL value is reached. In consequence,
only x feedbacks may be received, with x =
∑ttl
t=1(1 − µ)tr. By setting r to x∑ttl
t=1
(1−µ)t
the requesting peer is guaranteed to receive at least x feedbacks (see line 5 in Algorithm 1).
In addition to its feedback, each peer sends to the requesting peer p (through the witness
message, see lines 19 and 46) the identity of the next potential witness on the walk, i.e., the
peer it has randomly chosen among its neighbors. Sending this piece of information allows
p to know the identity of all potential witnesses. As will be shown in Section 4.4, this allows
to detect non participants (if any) and then to motivate them to participate by applying a
tit-for-tat strategy. As for feedbacks, non participation may prevent the requesting peer
from receiving witness messages. A similar analysis to the preceding one shows that if r
random walks are initiated then y =
∑ttl−1
t=0 (1 − µ)tr witness messages will be received.
Note that a requesting peer can adapt its collect policy according to its knowledge of
the target server, or of its neighborhood. Specically, to get x witnesses, a peer can either
increase ttl and restrict r, or increase r and lower ttl. Enlarging ttl would be more sensitive
to colluding peers that bias the random walk. However, this technique would increase the
set of crawled witnesses, and thus would aord new peers the opportunity to be known
by other peers and consequently to increase both their participation and their credibility.
Conversely, enlarging r would crawl only peers in the neighborhood of the requesting peer.
However, this technique would increase the chance to nd a path that does not contain
colluding peers 2.
4.2 Reputation of a Server
Estimation of the reputation value of a target server is based on the QoS directly observed at
the server (if any) and on the feedbacks received during the collect phase. The accuracy of the
estimation depends on the way these informations are aggregated. The aggregation function
we propose answers the following qualitative and quantitative preoccupations: First, to
minimize the negative inuence of unreliable information, feedbacks are weighted by the
credibility of their senders. Briey, credibility is evaluated according to the past behavior of
peers and reects the condence a peer has in the received feedback. Credibility computation
is presented in the next subsection. Second, to prevent malicious nodes from ooding p with
2Remark that selecting peers according to their credibility should be more ecient in the sense that
only highly credible peers would be selected, however, newcomers may be penalized by this ltering.
Furthermore, the resilience of the crawling technique to collusion highly relies on the way the graph of
witnesses is constructed. Studying these issues is part of our future work.
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fake feedback and thus from largely impacting the accuracy of its estimation, p keeps only
a subset of each received feedback. More precisely, among the set of observations sent by
each witness over the last D time units, only the last f ones are kept, with f the size of the
smallest non-empty set of non-default feedbacks received by p (i.e., f = mink∈Psp(t)(|F sk (t)|)
with t ∈ [max(0, t − D), t]). Finally, if among all the witnesses (including p) none has
recently directly interacted with s (i.e., f = 0), then p aects a maximal value obsmax to s's
reputation value. Aecting a maximal value reects the key concept of the Dempster-Shafer
theory of evidence which argues that "there is no causal relationship between a hypothesis
and its negation, so lack of belief does not imply disbelief". In our context, applying this
principle amounts in xing an an priori high reputation to unknown servers, and then
updating the judgment according to subsequent interactions and observations [19].
We can now integrate these principles within the aggregation function we propose. Let
us rst introduce some notations: Let Fsk(t) be the union of the last f non-default feedbacks
received from k during the last D time units (t ∈ [max(0, t − D), t]); Psp(t) be the set of
witnesses k for which Fsk(t) is non empty; ρsk(t) represent the mean value of the observations
drawn from Fsk(t); and csp,k(t) the credibility formed by p at time t about k regarding s.
Then, at time t, p estimates s's reputation value as follows:
rsp(t) =
{ 1∑
k∈Psp(t)
cs
p,k
(t)
∑
k∈Psp(t) c
s
p,k(t).ρk(t) if f 6= ∅
obsmax otherwise
(1)
with, ρsk(t) =
1
f
∑
(obss
k
(t′),t′)∈Fs
k
(t) obs
s
k(t
′)
4.3 Trust in Witnesses
In this section, we tackle the issue of malicious peers. As remarked in the Introduction,
malicious peers may alter the eciency of the reputation mechanism by sending feedbacks
that over-estimate or sub-estimate the observed QoS of a server to inate or tarnish its
reputation. This is all the more true in case of collusion. We tackle this issue by evaluating
peers credibility. Credibility is a [0,1]-valued function which represents the condence formed
by peer p about the truthfulness of q's ratings. This function is local and is evaluated on the
recent past behavior of both p and q peers. It is locally used to prevent a false credibility from
being propagated within the network. Specically, peer p estimates at time t how credible
q is regarding server s as a decreasing function of the distance between q's feedbacks on s's
eort and p's direct observations on s's QoS. As for the reputation value computation, the
distance is computed on the last f observations made by both p and q during the last D
time units. Note that in case p has not recently observed s's QoS, then credibility of all
its witnesses are set to a default value c0. Indeed, p cannot evaluate the distance between
its own observations and those observed by witnesses. Determining c0 value needs to solve
the following trade-o: by aecting a high value to the default credibility one increases the
vulnerability of the system to the whitewashing phenomenon, that is, the fact that peers
change their identity in order to reset their credibility to the default value. However, by
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setting this variable to a low value the mechanism tends to lter out new witnesses and thus,
loses the benet of the potential information a new peer can aord, which clearly decreases
the usefulness of the reputation mechanism. In order to cope with that, we set c0 to the
value of a decreasing function of φ, with φ an estimation of the number of whitewashers
in the network. By adopting the notations of Equation 1, csp,q(t) represents the credibility
formed by p at time t about q regarding the target server s, and is given by:
csp,q(t) =
{
1 − |ρsq(t) − ρsp(t)|α if f 6= ∅
c0 otherwise
(2)
where |ρsq(t) − ρsp(t)|α represents the distance between q and p's observations. Note that α
is the variable introduced in Section 3. Then we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. (Credibility Accuracy) Eventually, credibility of a peer q evaluated by any
correct peer p reects q's behavior with a precision ε. That is, let β ∈]0, 1[ be some xed real,
there exists t such that, for all t ≥ t,
Prob(|csp,q(t) − wsq(t)| ≤ ε) ≥ 1 − β.
Proof. (sketch) Suppose rst that witness q is correct. Then by denition wq = 1. As q truth-
fully reports the QoS of s it has observed during the last interval of length D, then obssq(t)
follows a normal law of mean q∗s . By the law of large numbers, ρ
s
q(t) =
1
|θsq(t)|
∑
t′∈θsq(t) obs
s
q(t
′)
eventually converges to q∗s . By assumption, p is correct. Thus eventually, ρ
s
p(t) converges to
q∗s . By Equation 2, csp,q(t) converges to 1 which concludes this case. Suppose now that peer q
is malicious. By denition (see Section 3), its observations are distributed around q. Peer q's
behavior is characterized by wq = 1−|q∗s −q|α. Then, csp,q(t) = 1−|ρsq(t)−ρsp(t)|α converges
to wq. Thus, for all p, there exists t such that, for all t ≥ t, Prob(|csp,q(t)−wsq(t)| ≤ ε) ≥ 1−β.
4.4 Incentive for Participation
Non participation may jeopardize the eciency of the reputation mechanism. A certain
amount of participation is required before reputation can induce a signicant level of coop-
eration. Facing non-participation in the reputation problem is challenging and has deserved
few attention [19]. To motivate peers to send their feedback we adopt a tit-for-tat strategy.
We introduce the level of participation notion as the propensity of a peer for replying to a
rating request. It is described by function lsp,q such that l
s
p,q(t) represents the percentage of
times q provided its feedback to p's queries regarding server s's QoS over the last D time
units, with lsp,q(t = 0) = l0 = 1. Its computation is performed after p's collect phase (see
line 10 of the algorithm. Note that factor µ prevents correct peers from being penalized by
walking breaks.).
We apply the tit-for-tat strategy during the collect phase. When a peer p receives a rating
request for s from peer q, then with probability lsp,q(t) p provides its feedback to q, otherwise
it sends a default feedback (⊥,⊥) to prevent p from being tagged as non-participant. By
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providing this default feedback, p lets q knows that its recent non-participation has been
detected. Consequently, by not participating, requesting peers drive correct witnesses pro-
viding them worthless feedback, which clearly makes their reputation mechanism useless.
Hence there is a clear incentive for non participating peers to change their behavior. The
following lemma proves that participation decreases the bias of the reputation value. As
previously, let us consider two peers p and q such that both peers are indistinguishable from
the point of view of the servers with which they interact, that is both p and q observe the
same QoS from these servers at the very same time, solicit and are solicited by the same set
of peers at the same time; However, p is correct while q is non participating. Then we claim
that:
Lemma 2. Participation decreases the bias of the reputation value. That is,
|E(rsp(t)) − q∗s | ≤ |E(rsq(t)) − q∗s |
Proof. (sketch) Let us consider some correct peer k, such that k solicits both p and q during
the same collect phase. By construction, lsk,p(t) = 1 since p is correct. On the other
hand, lsk,q(t) < 1 by assumption. Suppose now that both p and q solicit peer k. Then by
construction, k provides its rating to p with probability 1 while it provides it to q with
probability 1 − lsk,q(t). By assumption both p and q have the same history in terms of
solicitations, thus q cannot receive more ratings than p. From above, p receives k's rating
with probability 1, and k is correct. Thus the quality of the feedbacks received by p is at
least as good as q's one. Which completes the proof.
4.5 Incentive for Truthful Feedbacks
We now address the problem of motivating peers to send truthful feedbacks. So far we have
presented strategies aiming at improving the quality of the reputation value estimation by
aggregating more feedbacks and by weighting feedback according to the credibility of their
sender. We have shown that by using both strategies, utility of correct peers increases.
However, none of these solutions have an impact on the eort devoted by a witness to send
a truthful feedback. To tackle this issue we use the credibility as a way to dierentiate
honest peers from malicious ones. As for non-participating peers, when peer p receives a
request to rate server s from a requesting peer q then p satises q's request with probability
csp,q(t). By doing so, p satises q's request if it estimates that q is trustworthy, otherwise it
noties q of its recent faulty behavior by sending it the (⊥,⊥) feedback. As previously, by
cheating, a malicious peer penalizes itself by pushing correct witnesses to send meaningless
feedbacks to it, leading to its eective isolation. We claim that this social exclusion-based
strategy motivates q to reliably cooperate.
Lemma 3. High credibility decreases the bias of the reputation value. That is,
|E(rsp(t)) − q∗s | ≤ |E(rsq(t)) − q∗s |
Proof. Similar to the one of Lemma 2, by replacing lp,q(t) with csp,q(t).
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Finally, to elicit sucient and honest participation, both strategies are combined, i.e.,
upon receipt of a rating request from peer q, with probability min(csp,q(t), lsp,q(t)) p provides
its feedback, otherwise it sends the default feedback (⊥,⊥) (see line 31 in Algorithm 1).
Theorem 1. The reputation mechanism described in Algorithm 1 is Incentive-Compatible
in the sense of Property 2.
Proof. (sketch) Given a non-participating peer, the result follows directly from Lemma 2.
Let us consider a malicious peer p and a correct one q. Then, from Lemma 1, there exists a
time t such that with high probability p's credibility is ε-far from 1− dα while q's credibility
is ε-far from 1. Then by applying Lemma 3, we conclude the proof.
5 Analysis
Computing the reputation of a peer reduces to estimating, in the statistical sense, its ef-
fort. Our algorithm falls into the category of robust estimation algorithms. Indeed, robust
estimation techniques consider populations where a non-negligible subset of data deliber-
ately pollute the system. This analysis describes the asymptotic behavior of the reputation
mechanism and its convergence time according to undesirable behaviors. In the following,
we assume that a fraction γ of witnesses are malicious.
5.1 Asymptotic behavior
In this section we determine the accuracy of the reputation mechanism with respect to
parameters α and ε. Thus for the purpose of this analysis, we assume that the number
of aggregated feedbacks f is innite. Recall that wq denote the characterization of q's
behavior, with wq = 1 if q is correct, and wq = 1−dα otherwise. By Lemma 1, csp,q(t) = wq,
when t → ∞. Moreover, the expected number of correct witnesses is (1 − γ)n + 1 while
the expected number of malicious ones is γn, with n the expected number of witnesses
(Figures are plotted for n = 10). Thus, by replacing csp,q(t) with their asymptotic values in
Equation 1, the expected reputation value of a server s estimated by a correct peer p when
t → ∞ is given by Equation 3:
rsp(t)t→∞ =
1
1 − γdα + 1n
((
1 − γ + 1
n
)
q∗s + γ (1 − dα) q
)
. (3)
The bias of the reputation value, when t → ∞ is given by the following equation:
|rsp(t)t→∞ − q∗s | = γd
1 − dα
1 − γdα + 1n
. (4)
Figures 1 and 2 show the bias of the reputation value with respect to d for increasing
values of γ (resp. increasing values of α). Recall that d = |q∗s −q| reects colluders' behavior.
Unlike mean-based reputation value estimation in which the bias linearly increases with d
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(as shown by the crossed curves in Figure 1), our algorithm bounds the power of colluders
whatever their percentage (dotted curves). Indeed, witnesses' ratings are weighted by a
decreasing function of d which lters out false ratings. Figure 2 shows the impact of α on
the bias of the reputation value. As can be observed, the bias decreases with decreasing
values of α, reecting the sensitivity of the reputation value to the distance between direct
observations and received feedbacks. Thus, decreasing values of α makes the reputation
mechanism very sensitive to false feedbacks.
Theorem 2. The reputation value is ε-accurate, with ε > γd 1−d
α
1−γdα+ 1n
.
Proof. The bias of the reputation estimation converges to γd 1−d
α
1−γdα+ 1n
(see Equation 4).
Then, given β and ε′ in ]0, 1[, there exists t such that, Prob(||rsp(t)t→∞−q∗s |−γd 1−d
α
1−γdα+ 1n
| ≤
ε′) ≥ 1 − β. Thus, Prob(|rsp(t) − q∗s | ≤ γd 1−d
α
1−γdα+ 1n
+ ε′) ≥ 1 − β. We conclude by setting
ε = γd 1−d
α
1−γdα+ 1n
+ ε′.
From the above, assuming an upper bound on γ, by setting the maximal bias to ε and
solving the corresponding equation one can derive an upper bound on α under which the
reputation value converges to the true eort with an accuracy level of ε. Hence, for α with
α ≤ α, the reputation value converges to the true eort with an accuracy level of ε, with α
given by:
α =
ln
(
n+1−
√
(1−γ)n2+(2−γ)n+1
γn
)
ln(ε)
(5)
To conclude, one can always nd a value of α such that eventually the reputation value
is accurate. This parameter, however, signicantly inuences the convergence time of the
algorithm. The next Section addresses this issue.
5.2 Convergence
In this section, we study the convergence time of the reputation mechanism. To do so, we
assume that the ratings of a malicious peer are drawn from a normal distribution with mean
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q and variance σ over [0, 1]. This assumption includes a wide range of possible behaviors.
Indeed, a small value of σ depicts peers that try to rapidly skew the reputation value to q
by giving reports tightly distributed around q. In contrast, a high value of σ depicts peers
that try to hide their mischievious behavior to other peers by giving sparse reports. While
the rst behavior is easily detected, the second one hardly skew the reputation value to q.
Recall that the reputation value is estimated by aggregating the last f interactions
witnesses have had with the target server during a sliding time window of length D. Finding
the optimal value of D is important. Indeed, it determines the resilience of the mechanism
to eort changes and the condence level in the estimation. The optimal value of D is the
one for which the estimation is at most ε-far from the true eort with a given condence
threshold β. To determine such a value, let us rst assume that f is known, and determine
a lower bound on Prob(|rsp(t) − q∗s | ≤ ε) ∀t ∈ D. Suppose that the credibility csk(t) is
ε′-far from wsk for all the witnesses k. Then, because of Bayes' Theorem, we know that
Prob(|rsp(t)− q∗s | ≤ ε) ≥ Prob(|rsp(t)− q∗s | ≤ ε||csk(t)−wsk(t)|≤ε′,∀k∈Psp(t)) ·Prob(|csk(t)−wsk(t)| ≤
ε′, ∀k ∈ Psp(t)). Remark that, assuming that the witnesses' credibility are ε′-far from wsk,
the probability that rsp(t) is ε-far from q
∗
s is maximal under the following condition (C):
credibility of correct witnesses is minimal, i.e., equal to 1− ε′, and the one of malicious ones
is maximal, i.e., equal to ε′. Then, we have:
Prob(|rsp(t) − q∗s | ≤ ε) ≥
Prob(|rsp(t) − q∗s | ≤ ε|(C)) · Prob(csk(t) ≥ 1 − ε′)(1−γ)n · Prob(csk(t) ≤ ε′)γn (6)
By Lemma 1, the probability that the witness's credibility is at most ε′-far from wsk converges
to 1 when t, and thus f , increase. Thus, this bound approaches Prob(|rsp(t)− q∗s | ≤ ε) when
f increases. Knowing the probability distribution of the reports, deriving a closed form of
the lower bound can be done. Then, given a desired condence threshold β for α ≥ α,
solution of Equation 7 provides two threshold values of d (d1 and d2 on Figure 2) beyond
which the false reports are eliminated:
ε = γd
1 − dα
1 − γdα + 1n
within [0, 1]. (7)
Using Equation 6, we can see the eect of α on the convergence time of the reputation
mechanism to reach the exact eort exerted by the server (see Figure 3). Decreasing values
of α signicantly increases the convergence time while it decreases the bias of the reputation
mechanism as shown in Figure 2. Thus a trade-o exists between the robustness of the
mechanism and its convergence time. By setting the value of D, the application designer
may derive the corresponding minimal number of interactions f and nally tune the value of
α such that the desired condence level is achieved within f steps through Equation 6. The
resulting reputation estimation is less sensitive to false reports, but still eliminates peers
that try to skew the reputation of the server to a value that is far from the true eort, by
ltering out extreme values of d (see Figure 2).
Finally, Figure 4 shows the impact of malicious peers on the convergence time. As can be
seen, a relatively small percentage of malicious peers has a minor impact on the convergence
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time since the number of correct feedbacks is hardly inuenced by false ones. On the other
hand, whenever a requesting peer has to face a large proportion of malicious peers, it can
only rely on its own feedback to estimate the eort exerted by the target server which
clearly takes longer than when helped by correct witnesses. The same result applies for
non-participating peers.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a reputation mechanism that achieves high robustness to
attacks and provides incentive for participation. This is achieved by an aggregation function
in which a subset of the information provided by randomly chosen peers is kept and weighted
by a condence factor locally computed. We have proposed a simple and local incentive
mechanism that guarantees a better quality of the reputation value estimation. Lessons
learned from simulations are twofold: rst, decreasing values of α guarantees a greater
sensibility of the mechanism to false ratings. It however increases the number of required
feedbacks as well, and thus the time to get an accurate estimation of the eort exerted by
the target server. Second, the presence of a large number of malicious and non-participating
peers does not prevent the mechanism from being accurate, however has an impact on its
convergence time.
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